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This study seeks to quantify the impact of government actions in mitigating vi-
ral transmission of SARS-CoV-2. On 19th March, the World Health Organisa-
tion declared a pandemic. Through this global spread, many nations have wit-
nessed exponential growth of confirmed cases brought under control by severe
mass quarantine or lockdown measures. However, some nations have, through
a different timeline of actions, prevented this exponential growth. Currently
whilst some continue to tackle exponential growth, others attempt to safely lift
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restrictions whilst avoiding a resurgence. To quantify the impact of govern-
ment actions and support existing theories as well as policy makers, a data-
driven model is developed. Data for two nations, Italy and Taiwan, is gathered
and used to train several neural networks. The results of the best-performing
model, the Long Short Term Neural Network, are optimized to investigate a
different scenario of mitigation measures for both nations. It is found a larger
and earlier testing campaign with tighter border control benefit both nations
by resulting in significantly less confirmed cases. Interestingly, this scenario
couples with an earlier but milder implementation of nationwide restrictions
for Italy, thus supporting Taiwan’s lack of a nationwide lockdown.
Introduction
On 31st December 2019, China reported to the World Health Organisation (WHO) the detection
of pneumonia with an unknown etiology in the city of Wuhan (1). The viral agent was identified
as a novel coronavirus, subsequently named SARS-CoV-2 due to genetic similarities to SARS-
CoV, that is almost identical (96% whole-genome level) to a known bat coronavirus (2–4).
Recognising the growing epidemic, China banned travel to and from Wuhan and activated a na-
tional emergency response on 23rd January, invoking travel and social distancing restrictions on
a national scale (5, 6). Despite these actions, the virus successfully spread on a global level and
by 11th March, the WHO had declared a pandemic (7). The ability of this virus to spread de-
spite acute public awareness and control actions is currently attributed, in part, to viral shedding
of presymptomatic cases (8, 9). With no currently approved vaccines or specific treatments,
non-pharmaceutical measures are the frontline of both offense and defense in ‘flattening the
curve’ and inhibiting the infamous second wave respectively (10, 11).
By mid-February, China had successfully demonstrated that the exponential growth of con-
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firmed cases can be vastly mitigated by mass quarantine or lockdown measures (12). Unfortu-
nately, by then the virus was beginning to take hold in several nations. In particular, Italy would
become the next epicenter of the pandemic (13, 14), with dire consequences on its healthcare
system; before the onset of the epidemics, Italy had approximately 5200 intensive care beds
available (15), and efforts had to be made to increase this number during the emergency (16): on
April 3rd the number of patients admitted to ICU reached an unprecedented figure of 4068 (14),
posing a serious threat on the solidity of the entire system. In these extraordinary circumstances,
the Italian government instigated severe lockdown measures similar to those implemented in
China (17).
Meanwhile Taiwan, despite its close proximity and frequent flights to China, continued to
contain the growth of confirmed cases through different yet efficient and effective government
measures (18). These actions never escalated to a nationwide lockdown. Nevertheless they
successfully prevented the exponential growth predicted by unmitigated viral transmission (19),
and did not overwhelm their healthcare system, which has a higher number of ICU beds (3.02
per 10,000 population (20)).
With the ultimate goal of providing a foundation that could serve policy-makers in the deci-
sion process, in regard to managing current outbreaks or preventing a future second-wave, this
study aims to understand the impact and effectiveness of the possible measures a nation can
employ to inhibit and constrict growth. Thus, we analyse these two different scenarios from
two different nations.
Government response with pandemic evolution: two nations, two counters
Italy declared a state of emergency on January 31st, when two Chinese tourists tested positive
for the virus in Rome. Direct flights between Italy and China were immediately suspended.
After 21 days of no confirmed cases, on 21st February, a severe case of pneumonia due to
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SARS-CoV-2 was diagnosed in Northern Italy in a man (termed ”patient one” by Italian news-
papers) with no history of travel abroad. In the following days several other cases, initially
linked, began to emerge (21). A ‘red zone’, encompassing 11 municipalities in Lombardy was
instituted on 23rd February, and put on lockdown to contain the spread. During this time, covid-
related google searches increased abruptly, signaling a new alertness of the population regarding
the epidemic. This was however, followed by sharp decline, which remained low for 2 weeks,
peaking again when the nationwide lockdown was declared. This suggests a relaxed awareness
of the general public until the nationwide lockdown was implemented. In the meanwhile, addi-
tional limitations were implemented in Northern Italy, e.g., the suspension of gatherings of all
kinds, either in public or in private spaces, the closure of museums and other cultural venues,
the closure of schools and childcare facilities, among others (22).
On 9th March, the lockdown was extended to the entire country, and in the following weeks
progressively increasing limitations were instituted to intra- and extra-regional mobility and
to the activity of retail and manufacturing businesses (Table S7). An increased and sustained
home presence can be clearly inferred by inspecting the volume of usage of online services like
Skype, Zoom, Netflix, among others, via google trends.
At the beginning of the epidemic, testing was limited to individuals that, in addition to
showing symptoms of influenza-like-illness (ILI) or Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI),
also had been in contact with a patient or had a history of travel in China. On 9th March, a decree
of the Ministry of Health updated the testing criteria to include anyone showing symptoms and
requiring hospitalization, thus removing the criterion of contact or travel (23). As of 24th April,
1, 642, 356 tests have been performed, and 106, 527 individuals resulted positive (14).
Taiwan acted fast and adapted effectively as the pandemic evolved (24–28). As early as 31st
December, they began onboard quarantine inspection of direct flights from Wuhan, China. On
20th January the Taiwan Centre for Disease Control (TCDC) announced the activation of the
4
Central Epidemic Control Center (CECC) “in order to integrate resources across government
agencies and further protect the health of the Taiwanese public from the outbreak” (29). Their
first confirmed case was reported on 22nd January; entry for residents of Wuhan was denied by
the next day with severe restrictions on Chinese nationals following on 26th January. Incom-
ing traveller restrictions quickly grew to cover regions where the virus was spreading (Table
S3), with entry banned for foreign nationals on 19th March (unless entry permit obtained) and
mandatory 14-day quarantine for those permitted. In rare cases where it was acknowledged that
mandatory quarantine orders had been issued later than ideal, retrospective health monitoring
was put in place for recently arrived travellers from specified regions. The TCDC provided up-
to-date press releases to keep the public aware of both national and international developments,
frequently making several announcements daily (29). To ensure compliance, Health Declara-
tion Forms (30) and mobile tracking were introduced with violators earning fines and enforced
group quarantine as detailed in Table S4. This combination of communication, quarantine and
tracking close contacts proved successful in limiting spread from outside sources (31).
The TCDC announced the first testing on 9th January and by the latter half of March, daily
numbers settled (and continued) at approximately 1,000 daily. This also involved a track and
trace program, with sometimes hundreds of individuals being linked to a single positive case
or cluster; isolation (32) or health management (33) was required for contacts, and testing if
symptoms surfaced or a shared living arrangement (34). Outside track and trace, testing ini-
tially targeted symptomatic travellers from Wuhan, however this was eventually expanded to all
incoming travellers, symptomatic or not, as well as community cases (Table S6). Further inter-
nal spread of the disease was mitigated by government actions on increased hygiene practices
and social distance guidelines (Table S8). This was further enhanced by the early securing of
4 million masks daily by end of January, growing to over 8 million by early March (35), thus
enabling compliance by both public and healthcare workers to the recommended guidelines. It
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should be noted, social distance measures never progressed to a national lockdown as seen in
Italy and other nations. Despite this lack of lockdown, by availing of google trends on netflix,
zoom etc., an increased home presence can be seen in mid-March which we interpret as a public
response to the growing number of cases in Taiwan. Google trends was also used to capture the
public awareness of the virus (Table S9), showing a generally increasing awareness throughout
the period examined.
To aid modelling and analysis, these measures were quantified (methodology in supplemen-
tary material) and illustrated in Figure 1 for both nations along with the slope of daily infections.
Previous analysis used to model the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and measure the impact
of government actions have largely been some combination of mathematical modelling (mostly
some variation of the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered or SIR model (19)) and statistical analy-
sis. These have concentrated on the impact of some combination of measures; travel bans (6),
travel bans and testing (12), travel with closure of entertainment venues and public transport (5),
case isolation and contact tracing with quarantine (36), quarantine and containment measure-
ments via fitted variables (37), social distancing and school closures (38), lockdown (39), levels
of social distancing (40), and so on. The key point being, it is often not possible to model
more than a few key features. To overcome this limitation, a completely data-driven analysis
approach is developed by gathering, from several different sources, a large, multifaceted and
diverse set of data for each nation. The variables that are targeted are those that could capture
the features underlying the temporal evolution of the epidemics as well as any cultural effects.
This dataset was analysed with neural networks, a model building concept from the machine
learning community.
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Figure 1: The top panel portrays the distributions of the growth curves in Italy (left) and Taiwan (right), along with the
indication of some key moments characterizing the chronological development of the epidemics. The areas shaded in grey
represent the timeframe employed by the neural networks to predict the growth, while the areas shaded in red indicate
the timeframe (April 7th-24th) employed to compute the optimization of the combination of control measures via genetic
algorithm. The bottom panel illustrates, for each country, the set of variables collected and utilized to describe and predict
the evolution of the epidemics.
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Quantifying the mitigation and environmental measures that affect the epi-
demic growth curve
To form the dataset, we combined information about the governments’ legal acts, the human
mobility, the social awareness on the pandemic, the volume of diagnostic tests, the criteria
applied to perform such tests, and the environmental factors and converted each variable into
a timeseries. The dataset is shown in Figure 1 and described in detail in the Supplementary
Material.
For each country, we collected the complete set of legal acts and decrees issued during the
pandemic, and coded each incremental step to form a single timeseries, Government Mitiga-
tion. The same procedure was applied to other qualitative variables; the criteria for performing
diagnostic tests and border control procedures (Testing Criteria and Border Control, respec-
tively). This data was collected from the Italian Ministry of Health (41), the Italian Ministry of
Interior (42) and the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (TCDC) (29).
The extent of effective home confinement was quantified in terms of online presence, via
Google trends of online services like Skype, Zoom, Netflix (Online Presence). Google Trends
was also used to estimate the perception of the communities about the epidemics using key
words (Table S9) (Population Awareness). National and international air traffic was gathered
as measures of human mobility from the online platform Flightradar24 (43) (National Flights,
International Flights).
The number of daily tests performed (Testing Volume) was obtained from the Italian De-
partment of Civil Protection (14) and the TCDC (29). Enforcement of restrictions was treated
differently between the two countries: in Taiwan, a combination of fines, enforced quarantine
and utilization of smart technology (Table S4) was employed, while for Italy the daily number
of police checks on individuals and businesses, collected from the website of the Ministry of
Interior (42) (Enforcement). Lastly, environment factors like Temperature and Humidity can
8
affect viral transmission (44), they were therefore included from World Weather Online (45)
(Temperature, Humidity).
Modelling the growth via neural networks
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Figure 2: Slope prediction (red) as computed by the best LSTM Neural Network model. Grey
shaded area indicates model time window for which predictions cannot be made, histogram
represents real slope values.
Since the inital outbreak, researchers have implemented neural networks to address mainly two
types of problems: (i) virus detection through images and (ii) growth forecasting. For the
former, researchers aim to develop an automatic detection system in which a neural network
(typically a deep learning model) learns the main characteristics of the resulting pneumonia
9
from historical images of infected patient (46–48). In the latter, researchers typically develop
a machine learning system to predict the future number of confirmed cases in a country from
historical data (49–52).
Unfortunately, current research on forecasting growth fails on two issues: (i) they do not
include a complete set of government decision variables in the study (maybe due to their largely
qualitative nature, making it difficult to encode and preprocess with neural networks) and (ii)
they do not provide guidelines on how those variables could be combined to mitigate the effect
of the virus (at least partially). Motivated by this, we implement three neural networks models
that use the data collected modelling: weather, government restrictions, population awareness
and social/travel dynamics as independent variables with the slope of confirmed cases at each
time (daily) as the dependent variable (output of the model). The models implemented in the
research study were: Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) (53), Extreme Learning Machine
(ELM) (54) and Long Short-Term Memory Neural Network (LSTMNN) (55)
The best performing neural network model in both problems was the LSTMNN method,
achieving the best mean ranking in the two problems considered. Furthermore, for the time
series prediction problem of Italy, the LSTMNN was able to go under 5% (4.92%) in Root
Mean Square Error Percentage (RMSEP) whereas for Taiwan, the LSTMNN method yielded
a RMSEP of 14.02%. As can be observed in Figure 2, the LSTMNN model is able to capture
the trend of the slope in both cases, with a more accurate overall error in the case of Italy. It is
important to clarify that the lagged values of the slopes (history of the slope), cumulative cases
or daily cases, were not included in the model to reduce dependence between input variables
and help researchers in the interpretation of the optimum values of the variables. These vari-
ables are usually the most discriminant in times series analysis, which highlights even more the
competitive results yielded in this study.
Consequences of enhanced government actions by optimisation
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Figure 3: Optimal solution for Italy. On the right axis, black solid line represents the origi-
nal variable, red solid line is the optimised solution. On the left axis the histograms of slope
values for original solution (grey) and optimal one (red) are reported. Last plot represents the
cumulative value of infected people in the country for original solution.
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Figure 4: Optimal solution for Taiwan. On the right axis, black solid line represents the orig-
inal variable, red solid line is the optimised solution. On the left axis the histograms of slope
values for original solution (grey) and optimal one (red) are reported. Last plot represents the
cumulative value of infected people in the country for original solution.
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As best performer when trained to predict the daily slope in cumulative infected cases, the
LSTMNN model has been selected for an optimisation study aiming at finding the best timeline
for the implementation of government restrictions. While using a neural network model as a
performance indicator for an optimisation process is not new, this is the first study of this kind
in the analysis of epidemic-related restrictions and infections. Each of the variables, modeling
the time series of the implementation of the government restrictions, enforcement and social
dynamics, have been parametrised to allow an automatic optimisation procedure to vary the
parameters, reconstruct the corresponding time series and predict the daily slope value (for
more details see supplementary material).
A genetic algorithm has been used to solve the corresponding optimisation problem for each
country and promising results have been found (Figures 3 and 4) that do not contradict previous
findings of epidemiological models. Intensive testing campaign in both Taiwan and Italy and
increased border control, accompanied by an ease in social distance measures, reduces the max-
imum of daily infections by 40% and 63% in Italy and Taiwan respectively. This corresponds
to a decrease of 16% in Italy and of 28% in Taiwan of the total value of cumulative infected at
the end of the time period.
Italy: Particularly in Italy, an earlier and more extensive testing campaign (+56%) could
have been combined with an earlier creation of red zones in Northern Italy and, interestingly,
with a milder implementation of the government mitigation plan on the rest of the country: the
localized restrictions could have been maintained as sufficient measures until 14th March. Fur-
thermore, in this scenario the country-wide suspension of manufacturing businesses, a measure
burdened with a substantial socio-economic impact, is delayed and limited to a shorter period
of time, while the volume of police checks, aimed at monitoring the population compliance,
is larger and commences earlier. This is all combined with an earlier and more pervasive con-
sciousness of the public about the risk posed by the epidemics and thus on the benefits of a
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temporary reduction of social contacts.
The containment of the growth is also optimally managed in Italy by earlier restrictive reg-
ulations on the intra- and extra- Schengen air traffic, and by entry restrictions that span beyond
the mere suspension of direct flights to and from China. As for the national air traffic, it could
have been maintained unrestricted for a longer timeframe: a finding to be read in the context
of larger and earlier testing, larger and earlier volume of police checks, better awareness of the
public, increased control on the infections potentially coming from abroad.
Taiwan: Although government actions in Taiwan successfully prevented exponential growth
of confirmed cases, the optimised model predicts earlier actions would have damped growth
even further. By allowing movable dates on border control decisions, Taiwan would have bene-
fited from even earlier actions against China (by a few days) and earlier self-health management
and home quarantine regulations against selected nations (those shaded in Table S3 in February
and March prior to 19th March by the maximum 10 days allowed). This allows a later date
for the travel restriction on all foreign nationals that was implemented on 19th March, as well
as a slight delay in the decrease of international flight volume. The optimizer increases testing
volume 2 weeks earlier than reality and suggests community surveillance and mandatory testing
for incoming travellers in the first week of the observatory period. Actions regarding mitigating
internal spread are also suggested earlier - heightened hygiene practices, self-health manage-
ment of positive cases’ contact and social distance guidelines should have occurred at least 3
weeks earlier (comparison of Figure 4 and Table S8). In addition, national flight volume should
be kept low to inhibit internal spread. This allows less people to stay at home as illustrated by
the reduced online presence. Finally we see people awareness and quarantine control can both
be delayed, the latter significantly. This suggests the Taiwan public awareness is sufficient, and
enforcement measures like fines and mandatory quarantine may not be necessary.
Comparison: Care must be taken in comparing the growth and government actions for two
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different nations. All data is not equal; different testing methods, diagnostic criteria and meth-
ods of counting confirmed cases can affect comparisons. There may also be underlying themes
behind data / variables, e.g., the availability of personal protection equipment like masks to en-
able adherence to control measures and keep health workers safe (3 workers from healthcare
settings where reported positive by TCDC (29), while in Italy more than 28, 000 healthcare
workers contracted the virus by the end of April (56, 57)), the method and extent of a countries
track and trace program in locating high risk individuals, cultural / social response of a popula-
tion to government actions, healthcare capacity and quality in early isolation and treatment. To
overcome such inequity of data in this study, Italy and Taiwan were simulated independently.
Variables were chosen to be those for which there was data readily available and have a) known
or suspected affect on growth curves or b) an ability to highlight any differences between the
two nations. Any overarching themes are then considered.
Testing: In volume of testing per number of confirmed cases, Taiwan exceeded Italy (58). In
volume of testing per population, the roles reverse while Taiwan began testing earlier. Regard-
less, in modelling both nations, the same recommendation resulted from optimization, higher
testing volume (and earlier). This agrees with results from a recent model that distinguishes
between tested and untested infections cases (59), benefits of systematic testing (60) as well as
statistical observations from South Korea (61): extensive testing with track and trace and social
distance restrictions may contain the growth to an extent where a national lockdown can be
avoided.
Border control: Either a reduction in international flights is required or a strong border control
measure. We see these two measures ‘meet’ in Figure 3 for Italy, where the optimizer only al-
lowed 10 day shifts. The border control in optimized Taiwan doesn’t drop below 0.7591 (which
is obtainable by 10 day shifts), which roughly equates to mandatory 14 day home quarantine for
incoming travellers. This allows slightly more international flights (Figure 4). These translate
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to earlier action against other nations than China for both Italy and Taiwan.
People awareness and compliance: In Taiwan, enforcement of regulations appears not to
be a driving factor while people awareness is seemed to be almost ideal. Italy, on the other
hand, would have benefited from earlier awareness by the public and earlier implementation of
quarantine control. These results seem to highlight the cultural and social differences of the
two nations and can be justified empirically using the well-known Hofstede dimensions (62).
Specifically, with a score of 50 in the Power Distance dimension, Northern Italy tends to prefer
equality and a decentralisation of power and decision-making. Control and formal supervision
is generally disliked among the younger generation. Furthermore, the high score obtained in
the Individualism dimension (76 points) accentuates the aversion of the Italian citizen to being
supervised and limited in his/her autonomy. Conversely, Taiwan is a hierarchical society in
which people accept that hierarchical order and needs no further justifications (the scores in the
Individualism and Power Distance dimensions are 17 and 58 points, respectively).
National lockdown: Taiwan never implemented a national lockdown and our results support
this decision, even hinting that the observed self-inflicted increase in home activities carried out
by the public was not necessary. However maintaining hygiene and social distancing while in
public was deemed important and should have happened earlier. Italy, alternatively may have
delayed or reduced their nationwide lockdown as a result of increasing testing, border control,
quarantine enforcement, public awareness and restrictions localized in the most affected areas.
Limitations: It must be noted that neural networks have limitations as they behave as stochastic
processes. It should therefore be highlighted that this study further complements existing results
by mathematical modelling and statistical analysis. That a data-only driven model arrives at the
same results, further fortifies their conclusions. It should also be noted that hindsight is 20-20.
This study does not serve to criticise governments’ management of the pandemic but to assist
in preventing a second wave. In particular at the time of most national lockdowns: China was
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the only example of a nation that had recovered from exponential growth (accomplished by a
nationwide lockdown); a large part of the research this study supports was not yet complete; the
power of testing and border control exemplified by South Korea and Taiwan respectively had
not been fully witnessed; and knowledge of the virus and how it spread via pre-symptomatic
individuals or reservoirs was not yet known. However, this exemplifies that as research contin-
ues and expands, so will our knowledge and with that more and more tools to overcome this
pandemic.
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Materials and Methods
Data Collection, Summary and Representation
Italy: Numerous sources were used in gathering Italian data, namely the Ministry of Health
(41), the Ministry of Interior (42) and the Department of Civil Protection (14).
Taiwan: The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (TCDC) released timely reports to the public
on government mitigation actions (29). This was previously reported by (24) for data available
until 24th February 2020. We extend this data by two months until 24th April 2020. and provide
updated Tables S3, S4, S6, and S8.
We summarize and quantify this data below.
Border Control
The different levels of action applied to travellers entering the country were equated to a numeric
scale. This ranges from 0 to 5 for national citizens and 0 to 7 for non-nationals as depicted in
Table S1, where 0 represents zero constraints and 7 entry banned.
Level 1 involves quarantine inspections that targets symptomatic travellers on direct flights
from an infected area. Level 2, whilst still targeting symptomatic passengers, opens to those
with a travel history to an infected area within 14 days. Level 3 requires health declaration
forms from an infected area by all travellers, therefore expanding the target to asymptomatic
travellers (30).
Level 4 relates to 14-day self-health management; for Tawian the TCDC describes this as:
hand and respiratory health, recording temperature and activities twice daily, avoiding public
places (wearing a face mask if necessary), and voluntarily contact local health bureaus immedi-
ately if fever or respiratory symptoms develop (informing the physician of any history of travel,
occupation, contact, and cluster) (33).
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Level 5 requires individuals to a 14-day home quarantine; again for Taiwan the TCDC
required travellers to follow several measures (30); mask on arrival, private transportation from
airport/point of entry, hand and respiratory health, stay at home, keep one meter away from
those sharing the same household and avoid contact with them. Quarantine/isolation hotels
can be availed of if one’s home/destination does not qualify for home quarantine. Groceries or
necessary products are to be obtained via help of household or family members, alternatively
one can contact the care and support center for quarantined/isolated individuals. Non-urgent
medical care should be postponed and if symptoms develop, individuals are not to seek medical
attention by themselves but contact health authorities to arrange their medical care.
Level 6 involves a restriction on entry visas for specified foreign nationals while level 7
involves a ban on entry for non-residents.
Italy: On January 31st, the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of
Health issued the suspension of direct flights between Italy and China. After this decision,
other measures of increasing severity have been taken to control the cross-border traffic. Data
regarding these legal acts was collected from the archive of regulations issued by the Ministry
of Health (41). Dates and detail are listed below in Table S2 along with the suitable quarantine
levels as described in S1.
Taiwan: Taiwan initiated on-board quarantine inspections on the same day China reported
cases of pneumonia of an unknown etiology in the city of Wuhan to the World Health Organi-
sation (WHO), 31st December 2019. From there they adapted to the global spread of the virus,
with different requirements rolled out for different regions of the world as outlined in Table
S3. As the epidemic in China worsened, Taiwan increased entry requirements for different
provinces of China. Initially they focused on symptomatic travellers from Wuhan, escalating
to an entry ban for Wuhan residents on 23th January, with severe restrictions on all Chinese
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citizens following on 26th January. Early February saw an entry ban for Chinese citizens and
foreign nationals with a travel history in China, Macau or Hong Kong, with home quarantine
for Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong residents. By end of February, as the virus spread globally,
Taiwan initiated a variation of self-health management and home quarantine for travellers from
Thailand, Italy, Iran, Singapore, Japan and South Korea. In March, as the situation in Europe
worsened, Taiwan further enhanced its measures by mandatory quarantine for incoming trav-
ellers from Schengen, U.K., Ireland, and Dubai. This was quickly followed by a large number
of Asian countries, Moldova, U.S., New Zealand, Australia and Canada. On 19th March, Tai-
wan announced banned entry for all foreign national travellers without documents of granted
entry.
In addition to these actions, in rare cases where it was acknowledged that mandatory quaran-
tine orders had been issued later than ideal, retrospective health monitoring was put in place for
recently arrived travellers from specified regions. Other scenarios that required spacial attention
to which the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) reacted include: the docking of the
Princess Diamond where the use of smart technology assisted in identifying and following up
with 627,386 individuals (64); special requirements in dealing with Taiwan residents on other
cruise ships; evacuating Taiwan residents from Wuhan (65); and an outbreak on a three-ship
fleet, Dunmu (敦睦) Fleet.
This information is summarized in Table S3, along with the allocated level as described in
Table S1. Some information was not included in the analysis, however, such actions are still
included in Table S3 for completeness.
Quantifying border control: To quantify these actions for both Taiwan and Italy, each country
is allocated a quality of control between 0 and 1 each day, thus creating a time series for both
countries as illustrated in Figure. S1. To compute this level of control on a given day for
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either country, the following procedure was followed using available data from John Hopkins
University (13).
The daily cases of every country reported globally have been collected and smoothed by
averaging each day over a three day time period (previous, current and day after). The percent-
age of daily cases associated with each country is then computed, with respect to the global
daily cases, and excluding daily cases in Taiwan and Italy respectively (as it is their protection
from incoming cases being gauged). For Taiwan, areas associated with China that were treated
differently, i.e., different regulations on different dates, include Hubei, Guangdong, Zhejiang,
China (rest), Hong Kong and Macau. When actions were directed by cities, provincial data
was used. In addition, some states of the United States (U.S.) were treated differently, namely
Washington, New York and California. As actions differed only by a day, the date of regulations
affecting these states have been taken to represent all of the U.S.
As different levels of quarantine are implemented for residents and non-residents (see Table
S3 and S2 for Taiwan and Italy respectively). Statistics from the Taiwan Tourism Bureau (66)
for 2019 have been used to encapsulate the ratio of travellers that are residents and visitors
as outbound and inbound respectively. For China, the national statistics were used for each
province. Similar information was obtained from the World Tourism Organisation for Italy
visitors (67) and returning residents (68) in 2018. This data has been used to obtain a weighted-
level time series by dot product of the ratios (country residents, non-residents) and the levels
associated for that day for each country. For example, with travellers from South Korea to
Taiwan
WL(SK)(n) =
2∑
i=1
L(SK)(n, i) ∗RT (SK)(i),
⇒ WL(SK)(37) = 0.4932 ∗ 1 + 0.5068 ∗ 0.7143 = 0.8552,
where L(SK)(n) is the level on day n from South Korea (on day 37 or 27th February we have
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L(SK)(37) = (5
5
, 5
7
) from Table S3) and RT (SK) is the ratio of travellers (outbound, inbound)
with RT (SK) = (0.4932, 0.5068) from (66).
The time series quantifying the border control for say Taiwan entry from each country is
calculated by multiplying the percentage of daily cases for a given country on a given day by
the weighted-level calculated for that country on that day Again, for the above example of South
Korea on day 37,
TS(SK)(n) = WL(SK)(n) ∗D(SK)(n),
⇒ TS(SK)(37) = 0.8552 ∗ 0.4092 = 0.3499,
where D(SK)(n) is the smoothed daily global percentage of cases associated with South Korea
on day n (with Taiwan cases removed). By summing all the time series for each country, the
daily total quarantine incoming measure for Taiwan (or Italy) on each day is retrieved. This
summing of reactions is illustrated by a stacked bar graph in Figures S1a and S1b for Italy and
Taiwan respectively.
Government Enforcement
Italy: To supervise and support the compliance of the population to the restrictions, the Min-
istry of Interior organized a massive monitoring campaign on both individuals and businesses.
Failure to comply to the restrictions could result in fines and/or criminal charges for individuals,
and fines and/or suspension of the activity for businesses. A daily report was released on the
website of the Ministry of Interior (42). From this report, data was gathered to measure the
extent of government enforcement, by using the daily number of police checks on individuals
and businesses. The two time series were first normalized between 0 and 1, separately, and then
averaged, to obtain the variable Enforcement.
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Taiwan: To encourage compliance with quarantine and isolation orders in Taiwan, fines were
introduced early of NT$150,000 and NT$300,000 respectively (USD$5,000 and USD$10,000)
and raised to NT$1 million (USD$33,000) on 27th March and mandatory group quarantine
at a designated centre. Health Declaration Cards were required by travellers from high-risk
areas from 24th January with smart technologies announced on 28th; this evolved into the
Entry Quarantine System announced on 14th February - an online system where travellers could
obtain a mobile health declaration pass on their phones. This hastened the immigration process,
allowed the Taiwan healthcare system immediate access to travel history of ‘perspective’ future
patients and further enabled mobile tracking of quarantined individuals. Inaccurate information
earned travellers a NT$150,000 fine (USD$5,000). By 3rd April, the LINE Bot system was
announced to track quarantined individuals, however the newer system also allowed voluntary
health reporting and updated information on prevention measures. These were reported to the
public (29) (ongoing) and previously noted in (24) (until 24th February 2020). Table S4 lists
and quantifies these consequences as a step function.
Testing
To capture the impact of testing, we incorporate both the volume of testing and criteria to avail
of testing.
Volume Italy: Starting from February 24th, the Department of Civil Protection released a daily
public report of the the number of tests administered, which was gathered from its website (14)
and employed as a variable Testing Volume.
Volume Taiwan: The TCDC initiated testing in early January, by 8th March, 13,855 tests had
been carried out, with approximately 1000 tests a day since. Underneath these testing numbers,
lies a track and trace program where contacts were categorized and treated accordingly. House-
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hold and close contacts required testing and isolation respectively (32, 34) while other contacts
underwent 14 day self-health management (29). Testing numbers were released in the TCDC
public reports (29). Days where exact numbers were not released, the daily count has been
interpolated by averaging the increase of testing volume over the ‘missing’ days.
Surveillance Italy: At the beginning of the pandemic, diagnostic tests were only performed on
symptomatic individuals traveling back from China. Gradually, testing has been extended to a
larger part of the population. Each extension of the testing inclusion criteria was modeled as a
step in the corresponding variable. The data was gathered from the website of the Ministry of
Health (69) and presented in Table S5.
Surveillance Taiwan: As with border control and testing volume, surveillance information was
publicly made available by the TCDC (29) and previously noted in (24). Initial suspect cases
were screened for 26 viruses and targeted travellers from Wuhan. As the virus spread, this
was extended to symptomatic individuals with close contact to infected individuals, clusters of
fever and pneumonia cases unresponsive to antibiotics. Testing of symptomatic individuals was
eventually extended to all inbound travellers. The step by step increase of surveillance and the
attributed level for quantification are listed in Table S6.
Social distancing
To capture the extent of social distancing, two factors were employed. Increased online pres-
ence was used as an indicator of home confinement, while government mitigation actions were
collected, listed and quantified by allocating specific ’levels’.
Mitigation Italy: Over the course of the emergency, the Italian Presidency of the Council of
Ministers, the Ministry of Health and the Department of Civil Protection issued several decrees
and ordinances of increasing severity, aimed at containing the spread of the epidemic. The first
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measure was the creation of several red zones in Northern Italy, while the last step was the
complete country-wise lockdown, along with the suspensions of all productive businesses not
directly involved in supplying essential services; an example of essential services, exempt from
the suspension, were food stores and pharmacies. The list of legal acts is presented in Table S7.
Based on the succession of these measures, we modeled the Government Mitigation variable as
a step function, with each step corresponding to one of the legal acts. The end value represents
the complete country lock-down.
Mitigation Taiwan: The start of public awareness and heightened hand and respiratory hygiene
recommendations started on 6th January through the TCDC (29). Through chance, school holi-
days commenced on 20th January, however they were extended for two weeks in response to the
increased spread of the virus. From there the government mitigation actions involved height-
ened hygiene practices with increased social distances guidance, e.g. large gatherings, wearing
masks in crowded public places, guidance for educational institutions (two cases forces a 2 week
school or university closure), etc. Yet, unlike Italy, they did not go into national lockdown. A
helpful component behind these actions was the availability of masks (35). The TCDC an-
nounced early a release of 1 million masks on 22nd January as well as a confirmed 1 million
masks weekly. By the end of January, a supply chain of 4 million masks daily was confirmed,
2.4 million of which were secured for healthcare workers, with the remaining being rationed
through the National Insurance Healthcare system. The list of regulations and guidelines re-
leased by the CECC are summarized in Table S8 with the allocated level.
Online presence: A daily measure of home confinement is equated to search query data via the
publicly available service Google Trends, using the search terms: Netflix, Amazon Prime Video,
Zoom Video Communications, Skype. Corresponding search volume indices were combined
into a single variable, Online Presence. Italy: As Figure 1 illustrates, a peak can be observed in
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the initial days of the country-wide lockdown (March 9th, Level 3 in Table S7), and the online
presence stays at high levels until the end of our data collection (24th April 2020). Taiwan:
Despite no national lockdown activated, an increased home presence can be seen in mid-March
in Figure 1. This coincides with an increase growth curve and hence could be interpreted as the
public’s personal response to the increasing number of cases in Taiwan.
Flight Volume
To quantify mobility within and outwith both Italy and Taiwan, data from national and in-
ternational arriving and outgoing flights have been collected from the online platform Fligh-
tradar24 (43). 49 airports in Italy and 12 airports in Taiwan have been used to collect daily
incoming and outgoing flight codes for a total of about 2,410 flights codes across all Italian air-
ports and about 724 flights across Taiwanese airports. Historical information for each flight code
was recorded to count daily arrival and departures for both national and international flights in
each country. Despite errors in recorded values, the number of national arrival and departure
flights are equal in value, therefore either number is taken to represent national flights. The rep-
resentative number of international arrival and departure flights are very similar in value, hence
their averaged is used to represent the number of international flights.
Weather
A recent study suggests weather parameters such as temperature and humidity can affect the
spreading of the virus (44). Data collected from World Weather Online (45) of 24-hours av-
erage temperature (Co) and humidity (%) values have been added to the data set. The online
service has been queried using Taiwan and Italy longitude and latitude representative coordi-
nates (23.7 and 121 for Taiwan, 43 and 12 for Italy). The value of humidity and temperature
in a specific location in the country has been taken as representative of that country-wide in
the period observed. It was found the average temperature in Italy between January 22 and
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April 7th has ranged between 5 and 20◦C (13 ± 3◦C), while the humidity ranged between 47%
and 94% (75 ± 11%). In Taiwan, temperatures have been higher overall (22 ± 3 ◦C) and the
humidity lower, ranging between 39% and 90% (71± 9.5 %).
Population Awareness
To quantify people awareness of the phenomena, Google Trends can be used (70). Data has
been collected here by querying people searches related to the list of keywords: ”coronavirus”,
”covid”, ”quarantena”, ”wuhan”, ”virus” (in Italy) and ”coronavirus”, ”covid”, ”quarantine”,
”wuhan”, ”virus” (in Taiwan). For each word the top 5 related queries are collected and the
results of all searches aggregated. The full list of is available in Table S9. In Italy it is possible
to observe a considerable increase in coronavirus related searches at the same time when the
country started implementing lockdown measures, contrary in Taiwan there is a steady increase
throughout the considered timeline.
Slope
With respect to the heathcare systems’ capacity, it is of critical importance to have under control
the daily number of infected individuals, a fraction of which will likely require admission to
intensive care (71). For this reason, the choice was made to develop a model that would predict
this information, rather than the cumulative number of infected. From the value of the daily
cumulative infected for each country, as reported by Johns Hopkins University (13), a daily
slope value is computed as the angular coefficient of the linear regression of the values of daily
cumulative infected of the current day and two days ahead, as a smoother representation of the
daily number of infected.
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Statistical analysis
To describe the relations between the modelled time series and the slope of the growth curve,
linear regression models were employed. For both Italy and Taiwan, Government Mitiga-
tion, Online Presence, Government Enforcement and Testing Criteria display a high degree of
collinearity, as presented by the correlation matrices in Figures S2 and S3. Principal Component
Analysis was therefore performed on these four variables and a summary variable was obtained,
which was called Lockdown, that accounted for 90.95% and 87.67% of the total variance, for
Italy and Taiwan respectively.
Lockdown and all other variables were defined as fixed factors, and fit to the slope of the
growth curve. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was then performed on the results of the
models.
Neural Network Implementation
The data collected modelling weather, government restrictions, populations awareness and so-
cial/travel dynamics, are used as independent variables for the multivariate time series analysis
where the slope is the dependent variable. Three neural network models are used: Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN), Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) and Long Short-Term Mem-
ory Neural Network (LSTMNN)
Neural Network Models
CNN: The first model implemented is a 2D Convolutional Neural Network (53). The advan-
tages of using CNN are the automatic detection of patterns and important features without any
human supervision and their computational efficiency due to its weights sharing architecture.
The deep CNN proposed in this study is composed of four sliding convolutional filters with
kernels equal to 8, 16, 32 and 32, each one connected in between by a batch normalisation layer
35
to speed up training and reduce the sensitivity, and a Relu layer to set to zero any value less than
zero. The output of the convolutional layers feeds into a dropout layer for regularisation, and a
fully connected layer for the continuous prediction of the output, the slope. The model depends
on two network parameters: the size of the CNN filter and the dropout layer probability; and
three training parameters: the mini-batch size, the learning rate drop factor and drop period.
ELM: The second model implemented in this study was the Extreme Learning Machine (ELM)
model (72). The ELM framework was originally presented to the scientific community by
Huang et al. (72) as a single hidden layer feedforward neural network, whose connections be-
tween input and hidden layers are randomly assigned. The only parameters needed to be tuned
are the weights between the hidden and the output layers, which are analytically estimated by
solving the standard least-squares minimization problem. This methodology significantly im-
proves the computational burden of the algorithm and allows it to process heavy datasets in a
reasonable computational time (73). ELM models have reported competitive performances in
both standard machine learning datasets (regression and classification) (54) and other more chal-
lenging problems such as image detection (74), time series (75), topological information (76)
or real-time river flow prediction (77). In the experimental study, the ELM neural network ver-
sion of the framework with sigmoidal and linear basis functions in the hidden and output layers
was considered. The model critically depends on two hyper-parameters: the number of hidden
neurons, S, and the regularization penalty term, C.
LSTMNN: The third model implemented was the Long Short-Term Memory Neural Network
(LSTMNN) method (55). Unlike the two previously described models, the LSTMNN method
belongs to the family of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). In traditional Feedforward Neural
Networks (FFNNs), information moves only in a direct way from the input layer to the output
one. RNNs are based on an architecture in which the data through the system moves constituting
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a direct cycle (78). The main difference between standard RNNs and LSTMNNs models is
that the latter are capable of memorizing a time series value for an arbitrary length of time.
The model depends on three network hyper-parameters: the number of hidden neurons in the
bidirectional LSTM layer, the size of the first fully connected layer, the dropout probability rate;
and three training hyper-parameters (initial learning rate, learning rate drop period and factor).
Data preparation
The collected data have been divided for training and testing, and reshaped as featureinput for
the multivariate time series analysis. Furthermore, in order to be able to use the neural network
models for the subsequent analysis, the optimisation of government restrictions, the dependence
of the historical values of the dependent variables had to be removed from the input features
space. Hence for the ELM and LSTM models the input features have been modelled as the
vector
Xt = [X(t), ..., X(t+N)] ∈ R11N
where N is the time window parameters, and X(t) is the vector of independent variables, at
time t as described in the Data Collection section. Conversely for the CNN model the input
space is defined as
Xt =
 x1(t) .. x1(t+N)... .. ...
x11(t) .. x11(t+N)
 ∈ R11×N
where xi(t) is the i-th independent variable at time t.
The optimal set of hyperparameters for the neural networks have been obtained by minimis-
ing the root mean square error on the predictions by means of a Bayesian optimisation process.
Bayesian optimisation is an algorithm used in global optimisation to minimise a certain objec-
tive function, treated as a black box, by varying the value of its independent variables. The
algorithm itself relies on an internal Gaussian process that approximates the objective function,
and is trained by subsequent evaluations of the true objective. The approximated model is used
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for optimisation to reduce computational costs and for its robust nature with stochastic noise
in function evaluations. The full set of parameters optimised for each neural network model
are those described in the previous paragraphs, together with the time window dimension as
described in Data Preparation.
Optimisation of government restrictions
The best trained neural network model is used to have a deeper understanding of government
regulations and their impact on the slope function. Taking
yt = N(Xt), Xt ∈ RM
as the neural network model, where M = 11N or M = 11×N depending on the model used,
the following optimisation problem has been formulated
min J(x), x ∈ Ω
where J(x) is the objective function defined as the maximum value of the slope along the whole
time frame considered. x is a set of optimisation variables designed to model government re-
strictions previously discussed (border control, enforcement, testing volume, testing criteria,
social distance, flight volume and people awareness), excluding weather parameters as they are
not controllable by government. The complete set of optimisation variables for each country
is described in Table S10. Ω is the feasible region defined by the lower and upper bounds of
the set of optimisation variables with some constraints. Inequality constraints are introduced to
enforce the temporal order of the variables modeling quarantine incoming and the step func-
tions of social distance, quarantine control (only for Taiwan) and testing criteria. To avoid the
optimisation converging towards a temporal delay of the first case, an equality constraint is in-
troduced to ensure the day of first confirmed case matches reality. The optimisation problem
aims to minimize the maximum value of the slope - this can be interpreted as minimising the
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number of daily infections so to not put the health care system under extreme strain. For Italy
the problem can be formulated mathematically as
min
x
max
t
N(Xt(x))
s.t
A
x1x2
x3
 ≤ 0
x7 +
11∑
i=8
xi ≤ T
x12 +
19∑
i=13
xi ≤ T
t = 1, t = {yt > 0|yt = N(Xt(x)),∀t}
x ∈ N27, L ≤ x ≤ U
where
A =
[
1 −1 0
0 1 −1
]
.
is the matrix defining the linear inequality temporal constraints on the quarantine incoming
variables. T is the time horizon parameter, and L,U are the vectors defining the lower and
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upper bounds of the optimisation variables. For Taiwan the problem is defined as,
min
x
max
t
N(Xt(x))
s.t
B1
x1...
x..
 ≤ 0, B2
 x6...
x12
 ≤ 0,
x13 +
19∑
i=14
xi ≤ T,
x21 +
28∑
i=22
xi ≤ T,
x29 +
46∑
i=30
xi ≤ T
t = 1, t = {yt > 0|yt = N(Xt(x)),∀t},
x ∈ N54, L ≤ x ≤ U,
where
B1 =

1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1

,
B2 =

−1 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 1 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
where B1 and B2 are the matrices defining the linear inequality temporal constraints on the
quarantine incoming variables.
The integer programming Genetic Algorithm is used to solve the optimisation problem.
Genetic Algorithms are stochastic global optimisation strategies that mimic the behaviour of
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natural biological evolution of mutation and crossover. They are initialised with a pool of
potential solutions and by evolutionary operators and applying the principle of survival of the
fittest, increasingly better offspring populations are generated, which terminate when no further
improvements can be made. Genetic algorithms have the main advantage that they can solve
problems with integer variables and the objective function is treated as a black box.
Supplementary Text
Statistical analysis of the timeseries regression
With ANOVA, we identified, for Italy, a significant effect of Border Control (F(1, 67)=7.26,
p ¡0.01), Testing Volume (F(1,67)=7.96, p ¡0.01), Temperature (F(1,67)= 5.33, p ¡ 0.05) and
Lockdown (F(1,67)= 25.64, p¡0.001). For Taiwan, we found a significant effect of Temperature
(F(1, 67) = 4.38, p ¡0.05) and Population Awareness (F(1, 67)= 47.98, p ¡0.001). Figures S4
and S5 show the estimated coefficients.
In Italy, Border Control positively correlated with the epidemic slope, as well as Lockdown
(β = 0.101, β = 0.361, respectively): these two results are likely due to stricter legal measures
taken in response to the increase in daily conformed cases (daily slope). Interestingly, the
coefficient of Testing Volume is negative (β = -0.17). This can be attributed to the fact that
when the growth curve began to decline (after March 27th), testing was extended, thus leading
to a negative correlation between the growth of the epidemics and the testing volume.
In Taiwan, Population Awareness was found to have a large and positive effect on the daily
slope (β= 0.897), coherently with the peak in awareness observed over the days of largest
growth. This can therefore be interpreted as the public reacting to the increase in growth.
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Neural Network Models
In this section, the performance of the different neural networks models for Italy and Taiwan
are statistically compared. Table S12 shows the Root Mean Square Error Percentage (RMSEP)
in the generalization set of the best run per model (out of 1000 runs), BestRMSEP , and the vari-
ation coefficient of the RMSEP in the generalization set for the different models implemented,
CVRMSEP. Furthermore, taking into account the set of RMSEPs of the different models over the
different runs, the mean rankings of RMSEP, RRMSEP, for the different neural networks models
are obtained (values shown in Table ??). From the analysis of the results, it can be concluded,
from a purely descriptive point of view, that the LSTMNN method obtained the best results in
the two problems considered in mean rankings. Additionally, the best LSTMNN achieved the
best RMSEP in Taiwan and second best in Italy (with a more consistent performance, more
homogeneous results, better CV).
In this study, hypothesis testing was used to provide statistical support for the discussion of
the results. A performance analysis through parametric tests could lead to mistaken conclusions
in this research study. A previous evaluation of the RMSEP values provided by the implemented
methods resulted in rejecting the normality and equality of the variance hypothesis. For these
reasons, nonparametric tests were implemented to determine the statistical significance of the
results previously reported (79). Specifically, two non-parametric Friedman tests were carried
out with the rankings of RMSEP of the models. For the two multivariate time series considered,
the p-values associated to the Friedman test were smaller than 0.05 (α = 0.05), and therefore,
the null hypotheses stating that all algorithms perform equally in mean RMSEP rankings were
rejected for both problems.
Based on this rejection, the nonparametric Bonferroni Dunn-Sidak test was implemented to
compare all neural network methods to the LSTMNN method (which was used as the control
method) (80). Table S12 shows the p-values results of the Bonferroni Dunn-Sidak test for the
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two problems considered. Thus, the Bonferroni Dunn-Sidak’s tests indicate that the control
method (LSTMNN) statistically outperforms all the remaining models in Italy and also outper-
forms, in statistical terms, the ELM model for Taiwain. Furthermore, the LSTMNN method
achieves the best mean ranking in the two problems considered, which, in our opinion, justifies
our decision to use it as the base model for the next stage (optimization study). An analo-
gous study was also performed to determine the model to be analyzed within all the different
LSTMNN configurations.
The best LSTMNN model for each country are obtained for the optimal value of hyper
parameters reported in Table S13. The multivariate time series model is able to capture the
trend of the slope in both cases, with a more accurate overall error in the case of Italy as already
discussed. This is mainly due to the less noisy nature of the Italian time series. It is important to
clarify that, as was already mentioned, the lagged values of the slope, cumulative cases or daily
cases were not included in the model to reduce dependence between input variables and assist
the interpretation of the optimum values. These variables are usually the most discriminant in
times series analysis, which highlights even more the competitive results yielded in this study.
Thus, the LSTMNN the appealing approach for the problem under study.
Optimisation
The optimisation of the government restrictions has been solved with a genetic algorithm. All
variables are considered integer and optimised within the bounds reported in Table S14, together
with their optimal value. The genetic algorithm, with population size of 100 and the maximum
number of generations as 1000, has been run with a stopping criteria as the maximum number
of generations reached or the average relative change in the best fitness function value over 100
generations being less than or equal to a tolerance of 1e− 10.
The optimisation process for Italy terminates after almost 600 iterations when the change in
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the penalty fitness value is less than the allowable tolerance. All constraints are satisfied and the
final objective function is 3755, with respect to the original value of 6272. This is almost a 40%
reduction with respect to the original vale and equates to a reduction of almost 21,700 infected
individuals at the end of the prediction horizon, corresponding to 16% of the actual total value.
The optimisation process for Taiwan terminates after almost 300 iterations again when the
change in the penalty fitness value is less than allowable tolerance. All constraints are satisfied
and the final objective function is 7.6, with respect to the original value of 23. This is almost
a 63% reduction with respect to the original vale and a reduction of 102 infected individuals at
the end of the prediction horizon, corresponding to 28% of the actual total value.
Discussion of optimization results
Italy
In the days between 20th and 27th March, the number of newly daily infected individuals in
Italy oscillated consistently between 5,210 and 6,272, putting a serious strain on the healthcare
system. The approach presented here was able to accurately predict the growth curve of the
epidemic, but more importantly, to pioneer a completely model-free approach to investigate a
scenario - an optimal combination of factors that would have resulted in a less critical, and less
challenging, growth curve.
In fact, the optimal solution that has been found resulted in a more distributed growth rate,
that reached a peak of 3, 755 daily growth, a 40% reduction compared to the original curve.
The results suggest that the optimal scenario could have been achieved with a combination of
increased testing volume and earlier, but milder, implementation of social distancing measures.
In particular, the number of diagnostic tests should have been larger and starting earlier in
the epidemic, at least 10 days earlier. By 20th March the number of administered tests was
206, 886, in the optimal scenario this should have been 477, 360, about 130% more. And by 7th
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April, the end of our observation, they should have been 1, 178, 400, 56% more than the actual
number (755, 445). The more extensive testing campaign should have been combined with an
earlier creation of red zones in Northern Italy, 11 days before, according to our results, but
interestingly the subsequent restrictions could have been milder: the red zones, together with
the additional restrictions in Northern Italy (Level 2, Table S7) could have been maintained as
sufficient mitigation measures until 14th March. Furthermore, in this scenario the suspension of
manufacturing businesses, a measure burdened with an enormous social and economic impact,
could have been delayed until 4th April, which is near the end of our observation window.
The earlier implementation of testing and social distancing is coherent with the result we
found for the optimal enforcement. That is the number of police checks, which are aimed at
monitoring the compliance of the population to the home confinement rules, businesses’ com-
pliance with the new occupational safety measures, and the observance of infected individuals
of the 14-days quarantine. In reality, these increased dramatically around 14th March. In the
optimal scenario, this increase occurs approximately 10 days earlier.
The optimization also identified an earlier peak in the online presence; this is seen as an
indicator of social distancing that must be read not only in light of the restrictions posed by
the government, but together with an earlier and more pervasive consciousness of the public
about the risk posed by the epidemic and therefore about the benefits of a temporary reduction
of social contacts. While in reality the peak of covid-related google searches only occurred on
24th February, in the days of the first cases, in the optimal scenario the community is alert of
the situation much earlier, around 11th February.
Finally, the national and international mobility: 31st on January, direct flights between Italy
and China were suspended. This was quite a swift response, and indeed in the optimal scenario
this measure is moved by only 3 days. But no additional restrictions were placed on the intra-
and extra-Schengen flight volume. Only on 17th March the decision was made to put in place a
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14-day quarantine for individuals returning to Italy from anywhere abroad (Table S2). Conse-
quently, the traffic of international flights continued regularly with its usual volume at least until
9th March, the day in which the lockdown was declared for the entire country. In the optimal
scenario, international air traffic should have been compressed earlier on, at least a week before,
consistently with the result found for the Border Control variable. There, the date of mandatory
quarantine for all travellers occurs 10 days earlier (the maximum allowed). Therefore, while
the initial suspension of connections with China worked well, it should have been accompanied
by broader and earlier entry restrictions. For national air traffic, in a perspective of larger and
earlier testing, earlier and heightened volume of police checks, better awareness of the public,
better control on the infections possibly coming from abroad, the volume of national flights in
our optimal scenario could have been maintained without restrictions for a longer timeframe
(23rd March).
Taiwan
Taiwan constrained their growth curve, never overwhelming their healthcare system. This was
through a system of coordinated and ever adapting measures, including border control, health
and social distance guidelines, and testing. By modelling their growth, we were able to recog-
nise their successful strategies, and suggest possible further enhancement.
In modelling Taiwan’s border control, days and level of impact for different regions were
taken into consideration. Allowing the date of some key actions to be moved (at a maximum
10 days), a more optimal border control was achieved. The actual roll out of actions for Hubei
and China involved: a quarantine inspection for symptomatic individuals from Wuhan on 22nd
January; Wuhan residents barred entry on 23rd January, mandatory quarantine for all travellers
in Wuhan within 14 days and 14-day self-health management for those travelling from China
within 14 days on 24th January and severe visa restrictions for all Chinese nationals on 26th
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January. In our optimal solution, all of these actions occur on day 1 (the earliest possible) - 22nd
January, resulting in a quicker and more severe reaction to travel from China. The majority of
the restrictions are recommended to happen a maximum 10 days earlier, that is: 14-day self-
health management for travellers from Italy, Iran, Singapore, Thailand and Japan; 14-day home
quarantine from Iran; 14-day self health for Taiwan nationals and 14-day home quarantine for
others from South Korea; 14-day self-health management from France, Germany and Spain; 14-
days self-health management for Schengen, Bahrain and Kuwait; and 14-day home quarantine
for Schengen. However, 14-day home quarantine for Taiwan national travelling from South
Korea and the level 6 restricted entry for all foreign nationals are allowed to be pushed back by
10 days. This seems to suggest a minimum threshold of border control should be maintained
(0.7591) but not as severe as was rolled out by the end of the observation period.
In the first week of March, there was a considerable jump in the testing volume in Taiwan,
when designing optimizable variables, the days of this large increase could be shifted. The op-
timizer places this date 2 weeks earlier, allowing for considerably more testing to be done over
the period in question. The surveillance of the population for testing is also pushed forward,
suggesting community surveillance and mandatory testing for travellers from high risk areas
should occur in the first week of this observation period.
Similarly, government actions in mitigating the internal spread of the virus should be rolled
out quicker. Heightened hygiene practices, self-health management of positive cases contacts,
social distance guidelines (public transport, educational institutions, large scale gatherings etc.),
cleaning of public spaces, retrospective health monitoring for incoming travellers - all should
have occurred in the first 2 weeks - in some cases this is over a month earlier than what tran-
spired. Phase 1 social distancing implementation and all later regulations are also recommended
earlier by over 3 weeks. Meanwhile the measure of people actually staying home (online pres-
ence) only increases at the very end of the period, suggesting little need for people to stay home
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as long as they adhere to the strict government guidelines - supporting the actions of Taiwan,
that is no lockdown was required.
For travel, a steady decline can be observed in both national and international flights in
Taiwan, with national flights starting to pick up again at the end of the observation period.
The optimizer suggests keeping national flights low - and hence is consistent with heightened
measures targeting internal spread of the virus. On the other hand, International flights are kept
to a similar decreasing trend as in reality but with a slightly larger volume. One could assume
with the tighter border control, slightly more international flights could be allowed.
Finally,the optimal solution shows the quarantine control variable is loosened greatly allow-
ing no fines instigated until the end of March. Meanwhile people awareness shows a slightly
delayed increase - this seems to suggest the awareness of the Taiwan population is sufficient -
and enforcement measures like fines and mandatory group quarantine may not be necessary.
Supplementary Figures and Tables
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Figure S1: Formation of border control measure for (a) Italy and (b) Taiwan. For each nation,
their reaction to different nations and areas are quantified and summed. The x-axis represents
time in days starting with 22nd January as day 1. The y-axis is the sum of the border con-
trol measures, the total ranging from 0 (no measures) to 1 (mandatory quarantine for national
residents and entry denied for all others). For visual ease, only the impact of 20 countries are
individually shown for Taiwan, in reality, 62 nations were individually calculated.
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Figure S2: Pearson’s correlation matrix of the modelled variables for Italy. Cells marked with
***, **, * and . represent a correlation coefficient having p ¡ 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1, respec-
tively
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respectively
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Figure S4: Results of the linear regression model on the Italian data. Temperature, Border
Control, Testing Volume and Lockdown have a significant relation with the epidemic growth
rate (Table S11). Dashed red lines represent the regression line, shaded areas represent the
confidence intervals at 95 %.
Figure S5: Results of the linear regression model on the Taiwanese dataset. In this case, only
Temperature and Population Awareness produced a significant effect on the epidemic growth
rate (Table S11).
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Levels Description of person applicable Action
0 Everyone None
1 Symptomatic from infected area Quarantine Officer
2 Symptomatic from infected area (< 14 days) Quarantine Officer
3 Asymptomatic from infected area (< 14 days) Health Card Declaration
4 14 days self-health management
5 14 days quarantine
6 Reduced entry (visa restrictions)
7 Entry prohibited
Table S1: Levels of action taken by a country to protect its border. Levels 6 and 7 cannot apply
to citizens or permit holders (legal residents, work permit holders, etc.) of said country.
Date Description Travel From Level
20/01/2020 Temperature measured for travellers coming
from China.
China 2
31/01/2020 Direct flights from China ceased. China (Italian)
China (Chinese)
5
7
05/02/2020 Temperature measured for all incoming trav-
ellers.
Anywhere 2
21/02/2020 Quarantine for travellers (symptomatic or not)
coming from anywhere after having stayed in
China in the last 14 days.
Anywhere N/A
17/03/2020 Quarantine for travelers (symptomatic or not)
coming from anywhere
Anywhere 5
Table S2: Border control measures initiated by Italy. Shaded regions are actions, the dates of
which are varied in optimisation
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Date Description Travel From Level
31/12/2019 Onboard quarantine inspection of direct flights. Wuhan 1
06/01/2020 Quarantine inspection of passengers. Passengers
report if symptomatic within 10 days of return.
Wuhan & nearby 1
09/01/2020 Report if symptomatic within 14 days of return. Wuhan & nearby 2
23/01/2020 Entry denied for residents of Wuhan. Wuhan (res) 7
24/01/2020 Stay home (wear mask if one must leave).
Avoid crowded places and public transport (mask if
must )
Novel Coronavirus Health Declaration Card
Wuhan (non-res)
China
China,Macau,HK
5
4
3
25/01/2020 Report if symptomatic within 14 days of arrival Everywhere 2
26/01/2020 Extensive visa restrictions on Chinese nationals China (res) 6
01/02/2020 Those returning from China to avoid hospitals and
healthcare facilities for 14 days. Healthcare pro-
fessionals to halt work for 14 days with self-health
management
China N/A
02/02/2020 Entry denied for residents of Guangdong
14 day home quarantine: entry via cross-strait air-
ports w/ Guangdong travel history (14 days)
14 days of self-health management
Guangdong (res)
Guangdong (res)
China, Macau,HK
7
N/A
4
03/02/2020 Entry denied for residents of Wenzhou
Home quarantine: travel history to Wenzhou
Extraction of Taiwanese nationals from Wuhan by
chartered plane: 14 day group quarantine
Wenzhou (res)
Wenzhou (non-res)
Wuhan (Taiwanese)
7
5
N/A
04/02/2020 Home quarantine: travel history to Zhejiang Zhejiang 5
05/02/2020 Cruise ships docked in China, Macau, HK within
14 days banned from docking
Cruise ships with suspected cases within 28 days
banned from docking
China, Macau, HK
Everywhere
N/A
N/A
06/02/2020 14 day home quarantine for Taiwan nationals,
14 day self-health management for Taiwan
nationals permitted entry
Chinese nationals forbidden entry
China, Macau, HK
(Taiwanese)
Macau, HK (Tai-
wanese)
China (res)
5
N/A
7
07/02/2020 14 day quarantine for Macau and HK nationals
Entry forbidden for foreign nationals with travel
history within 14 days to China, Macau, HK
Macau, HK (res)
China, Macau, HK
(foreigners)
5
7
08/02/2020 Taiwanese passengers on infected cruise ships al-
lowed to return after 2 negative tests, followed by
14 day self-health management on return
Everywhere (Tai-
wanese)
N/A
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Date Description Travel From Level
10/02/2020 14 day quarantine: passengers transiting thro’ China, Macau, HK N/A
11/02/2020 Health declaration form Everywhere 3
13/02/2020 Foreign nationals prohibited transiting or entry Cruise ships N/A
14/02/2020? Passenger Health Declaration and Home Quaran-
tine Information System (Entry Quarantine Sys-
tem)
Everywhere N/A
15/02/2020 14 day home quarantine: avoid public transport
from airport (wear mask if must)
Endemic (China) N/A
22/02/2020 Taiwanese passengers on infected cruise ships al-
lowed to return after 2 negative tests, followed by
14 day group quarantine on return
Everywhere (Tai-
wanese) (Princess
Diamond)
N/A
24/02/2020 14 day self-health management Thailand, Italy,
Iran, Singapore,
Japan
4
25/02/2020 14 day home quarantine from South Korea (SK)
14 day self-health management from SK
SK (foreign)
SK (Taiwanese)
5
4
27/02/2020 14 day home quarantine from SK SK (Taiwanese) 5
28/02/2020 14 day home quarantine Italy 5
02/03/2020 14 day home quarantine (not including transits)
14 day home isolation
Iran
Infected flight
5
N/A
07/03/2020 14 day self-health management France, Germany,
Spain
4
11/03/2020 14 day self-health management Schengen, Bahrain,
Kuwait
4
14/03/2020 14 day home quarantine
14 day self-health management
Schengen, UK, Ire-
land, Dubai
Everywhere
5
4
17/03/2020 14 day home quarantine Asia19, Moldova,
California, Wash-
ington, New York
5
18/03/2020 14 day home quarantine New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, Canada, U.S.
5
19/03/2020 14 day home quarantine
Entry banned without entry permit
Everywhere
Foreign nationals
5
6
24/03/2020 Suspension of transit of airline passengers through
Taiwan
Everywhere N/A
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Date Description Travel From Level
01/04/2020 Home quarantined travellers prohibited from trav-
eling to offshore islands by plane or boat.
Residents of offshore islands urged to undergo
home quarantine and related measures on the main
island
Everywhere N/A
03/04/2020 Travellers symptomatic within 14 days to be tested
and use designated transport vehicles to a desig-
nated location for home quarantine.
Everywhere N/A
18/04/2020 Inbound travelers who have visited Europe and the
Americas within 14 days should voluntarily present
documents for home quarantine requirements be-
fore boarding.
Such travelers should stay at quarantine hotels if
they live with increased-risk individuals
Everywhere N/A
19/04/2020 Hospital isolation for positive cases, group quaran-
tine for all others.
Members of
navy from
infected ships
N/A
21/04/2020 Inbound travelers who have visited Southeast Asia
within 14 days should complete the COVID-19
Health Declaration and Home Quarantine Notice
and confirm if their residence satisfies home quar-
antine requirements before boarding.
Such travelers should stay at quarantine hotels if
they live with increased-risk individuals.
Everywhere N/A
Table S3: Border control measures initiated by Taiwan. Date of action and border control level
designation as described by Table S1. Quarantine inspection implies fever screening of arriving
passengers, screening suspected cases through inquiring about their history of travel, occupa-
tion, contact, and cluster and conducting health assessments. In applying levels to population in
this study, “Wuhan” and “Wuhan + nearby” are taken to be the Hubei province. Wenzhou city
is taken as the Zhejiang province. N/A notes information that was not included in the analysis
but which we list for completeness. HK and SK are shorthand for Hong Kong and South Korea
respectively. Asia19 refers to 19 Asian countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, East
Timor, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. Infected navy ships refers to Navy
serving on a three-ship fleet, Dunmu (敦睦) Fleet. Shaded regions are actions, the dates of
which are varied in optimisation
56
Date Regulation Description Level
28/01/2020 Smart technology utilised to provide assistance in prevention. 1
11/02/2020 Inaccurate information from travellers (refusal, evasion, interfer-
ence) results in a fine up to NT150,000.
2
12/02/2020 Violators of home isolation fined up to NT300,000. Violators of
home quarantine fined up to NT150,000.
3
27/03/2020 Fines increased up to NT1 million for violation of quarantine or
isolation measures and put into group quarantine.
4
03/04/2020 LINE Bot system: Disease Containment Expert introduced to
track people in home quarantine
5
05/04/2020 Fine up to NT15,000 for not wearing mask on public transport. 6
Table S4: Enforcement actions taken in Taiwan.
Date Description Level
22/01/2020 Testing symptomatic travellers coming from China 1
27/01/2020 Testing symptomatic individuals that had contact with a con-
firmed patient in the last 14 days
2
22/02/2020 Testing individuals showing symptoms of either influenza-like-
illness (ILI) or Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI), and
that has been in contact with a suspect case, or with history of
travel in China
3
09/03/2020 Testing anyone showing ILI or SARI symptoms and that requires
hospitalization
4
Table S5: Decision criteria employed in Italy for diagnostic tests
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Date Description Level
06/01/2020 Healthcare facilities to reinforce case reporting of severe cases of
pneumonia among travellers from Wuhan.
1
24/01/2020 Travellers from Wuhan with fever or acute respiratory tract infec-
tion
2
12/02/2020 Mandatory testing for severe complicated influenza cases,
cases of community-acquired upper respiratory infections under
surveillance and clusters of upper respiratory infections who were
reported on and after January 31 and whose specimens tested neg-
ative
3
16/02/2020 Community surveillance expanded to include
1) Any individuals with foreign travel history in the past 14 days
or any individuals who have had contact with symptomatic for-
eign travelers with a fever or respiratory symptoms and highly
suspected of having the said COVID-19 symptoms caused in the
past 14 days.
2) Clusters of cases of fever/respiratory symptoms.
3) Pneumonia cases whose symptoms haven’t improved after
three days of antibiotic therapy for unknown cause or clusters of
pneumonia cases or healthcare workers having pneumonia.
4
18/03/2020 Retrospective testing for symptomatic people entering from Eu-
rope, Egypt, Turkey, Dubai
5
21/03/2020 Retrospective testing for symptomatic people entering from US,
East Asia
6
07/04/2020 Mandatory testing for inbound travellers with fever or symptoms
in the past 14 days
7
Table S6: Decision criteria employed in Taiwan for diagnostic tests
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Levels Date Description
1 23/02/2020 Creation of red zones in Northern Italy
2 25/02/2020 Additional limitations in the red zones: suspension of sport
events, meetings, school trips
3 1/03/2020 Closure of schools, suspension of events of all kinds in the red
zones
4 4/03/2020 Closure of schools and universities in the whole country
5 8/03/2020 ”Stay home” Decree Law
6 11/03/2020 Closure of restaurants, bars and retail stores
7 20/03/2020 Closure of parks, ban on outdoor sport activities
8 22/03/2020 Closure of non-essential manufacturing businesses
Table S7: Chronology of legal acts taken in Italy to contain the spread of the epidemics (81)
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Date Mitigation Description Level
06/01/2020 Healthcare facilities: Workers strictly adhere to standard precau-
tions for preventing nosocomial infection, wearing N95 respira-
tors while performing invasive medical procedures. Heightened
vigilance for suspected cases, and thoroughly implement the in-
quiry of patients for history of travel, occupation, contact, and
cluster (TOCC).
1
20/01/2020 School holidays begin (later extended 2 weeks). 2
24/01/2020 Heightened hygiene practices: Healthy public to take tempera-
ture, wash hands thoroughly with soap, avoid touching eyes, nose
and mouth with hands and avoid crowded public places. If symp-
tomatic, rest at home and stay clear of crowded public places
(wear surgical mask if must).
3
25/01/2020 14 days of self-health management (since contact): Those with
possible contact with a known positive case, if symptomatic, re-
port to hotline.
4
29/01/2020 The CECC issued relevant guidance for public transportation,
public gatherings, educational institutions and groups and pro-
vided advice on prevention measures to reduce the risk of infec-
tion. (82)
5
12/02/2020 CECC reiterates close contacts are required to abide by home iso-
lation or quarantine as instructed by the government.
6
19/02/2020 Public to regularly wash their hands with soap, ensure proper
ventilation in their homes, and regularly clean their homes’ in-
terior and exterior. Upcoming school reopenings: CECC reminds
schools and public kindergartens to institute appropriate cleaning
and disinfection procedures for their classrooms and school buses.
Public transportation operators to step up disinfection measures.
7
23/02/2020 Local environmental protection departments tasked with disin-
fecting public spaces surrounding schools and public kinder-
gartens and spaces within them which were open to the general
public during the winter vacation, such as large hallways, wash
basins, restrooms, and playgrounds. (by 23/02).
8
25/02/2020 Schools reopen (conditional: more than one case in a school re-
sults in a 2 week closure).
7
05/03/2020 CECC issued Guidelines for Large-Scale Public Gatherings in the
Wake of the COVID-19 Outbreak (see attachment) to give guid-
ance for organizing public gatherings (83).
8
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Date Mitigation Description Level
18/03/2020 Retrospective health monitoring on individuals entering Taiwan
from Europe, Egypt, Turkey and Dubai.
9
21/03/2020 Retrospective health monitoring symptomatic for people entering
from US, East Asia.
10
25/03/2020 Indoor events with 100+ people and outdoor gatherings 500+ peo-
ple to be suspended. Organizers of these gatherings can conduct
risk assessments
11
01/04/2020 Phase 1 social distancing implemented: outdoor 1m+, indoor
1.5m+ separation, wear masks otherwise.
12
05/04/2020 Public transport riders urged to wear masks at all times and un-
dergo temperature checks before entering bus or MRT station
(NT15,000 fine)
13
06/04/2020 14 self-health management for those who attended temple festi-
val, if unwell, call hotline
14
09/04/2020 Host and hostess clubs and ballrooms suspend operations. 15
10/04/2020 Crowd control measures imposed at public places where large
crowds can gather
16
14/04/2020 Home quarantine/isolation for incoming from Europe and Amer-
icas with quarantine hotels for those who live with increased risk
individuals.
17
Table S8: Mitigation actions taken in Taiwan. Increased risk individuals refers to people over
64 years old, children under 7 years old, persons with chronic disease or persons who don’t
have a separate room (including a separate bathroom)
Italy Taiwan
italia coronavirus, notizie coronavirus,
news coronavirus, il coronavirus, coron-
avirus, covid 19, covid italia, coronavirus
covid 19, autocertificazione covid, covid,
la quarantena, quarantena coronavirus,
quarantena italia, quarantena fine, quar-
antena, wuhan coronavirus, cina, wuhan
cina, virus wuhan, wuhan, virus corona,
virus italia, corona virus italia, cina virus,
virus
coronavirus taiwan, taiwan, coronavirus
update, coronavirus cases, coronavirus,
covid 19, covid taiwan, covid-19, covid
19 taiwan, covid,quarantine 中文, quar-
antine 意 思, self quarantine,隔 英
文 quarantine, quarantine, wuhan virus,
wuhan coronavirus, wuhan pneumonia,
wuhan, virus corona,corona, taiwan virus,
virus
Table S9: People awareness keywords list
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Italy Taiwan
x1, x2, x3 x1, .., x12 Quarantine incoming: variables are dates of actions as high-
lighted in Tables S2 and S3.
x4, x5 x13;x14, ...x19 Quarantine control: for Italy the first variable models the
time and the second variable models the shift; for Taiwan
the first variable models the time of the initial step and the
rest of the variables model the step function interval sizes
x6 x20 Testing: the variable models the shift in time of the day in
which testing had a steep increase
x7;x8..., x11 x21;x22, ...x28 Testing criteria: the first variable models the time of the ini-
tial step and the rest of the variables model the step function
interval sizes
x12;x13, .., x19 x29;x30, ..x46 Social distance: the first variable models the time of the ini-
tial step and the rest of the variables model the step function
interval size
x20, x21 x47, x48 Social distance online platform: the first variable models
the time and the second variable models the shift
x22, x23 x49, x50 Flights national: the first variable models the time and the
second variable models the shift
x24, x25 x51, x52 Flights international: the first variable models the time and
the second variable models the shift
x26, x27 x53, x54 People awareness: the first variable models the time and the
second variable models the shift
Table S10: Government restriction optimisation variables list and descriptions
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Italy Taiwan
Effects Estimate SE CI p Estimate SE CI p
Intercept -1.55e-16 0.029
-0.058
0.058 1 3.31e-16 0.057
-0.114
0.114 1
Lockdown 0.361 0.071
0.218
0.503 0.000 -0.193 0.118
-0.430
0.043 0.107
Border Con-
trol
0.101 0.037
0.026
0.177 0.008 0.089 0.065
-0.041
0.219 0.176
Testing Vol-
ume
-0.170 0.060
-0.290
-0.049 0.006 0.146 0.257
-0.367
0.660 0.570
National
Flights
-0.143 0.193
-0.529
0.241 0.381 -0.033 0.082
-0.198
0.132 0.691
International
Flight
-0.276 0.167
-0.612
0.058 0.084 -0.102 0.345
-0.792
0.588 0.768
Temperature -0.071 0.031
-0.133
-0.009 0.007 0.154 0.073
0.007
0.301 0.040
Humidity 0.037 0.031
-0.025
0.100 0.170 -0.099 0.069
-0.236
0.039 0.159
Population
Awareness
0.030 0.066
-0.102
0.162 0.599 0.897 0.129
0.639
1.156 0.000
Table S11: Results of the linear regression models. Columns indicate the estimated regression
coefficient of each effect, its standard error of the mean, the 95% confidence interval and the
computed p value.
Italy
Models BestRMSEP CVRMSEP RRMSEP p-valueB−DS (LSTMNN)
CNN 0.0277 0.4858 6.0589 0.0000†
ELM 0.0529 0.3031 6.1222 0.0000†
LSTMNN 0.0492 0.3005 2.8189 -
Taiwan
Models BestRMSEP CVRMSEP RRMSEP p-valueB−DS (LSTMNN)
CNN 0.1775 0.5056 4.6589 0.3942
ELM 0.1367 0.3348 6.0011 0.0000†
LSTMNN 0.1402 0.4350 4.3400 -
Table S12: Statistical results of the neural networks implemented
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LSTM Italy Taiwan
Time Window 14 21
Number of Hidden Units 155 770
First Layer Size 469 107
Dropout Layer probability 0.18 0.69
Initial Learn Rate 2.4e-04 5.2e-06
Learn Rate Drop Factor 0.02 0.01
Learn Rate Drop Period 111 88
Table S13: LSTM optimal hyper parameters for Italy and Taiwan
Italy bounds optimal
value
Taiwan bounds optimal
value
x1, x2, x3 [1,20], [5,25],
[20,76]
13, 21, 46 x1, .., x12 [1 3], [1 5], [1 5],
[1 9], [24 44], [48
68], [31 51], [25
45], [27 47], [36
56], [43 63], [40
60]
1, 1, 1, 1,
24, 68, 31,
25, 47, 36,
43, 40
x4, x5 [15, 50], [-14,14] 44, -11 x13;x14, ...x19 [1,20], [1, 50]6 20, 48, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1
x6 [20,50] 24 x20 [30,60] 31
x7;x8..., x11 [1,10], [1, 30]4 3, 3, 23, 30,
15
x21;x22, ...x28 [1,20], [1, 50]7 1, 1, 1, 1, 5,
1, 1, 27
x12;x13, .., x19 [20,40], [1, 30]7 22, 17, 14,
1, 1, 10, 8,
3
x29;x30, ..x46 [1,20], [1, 30]17 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
5, 30, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1
x20, x21 [15,50], [-14,14] 49, -3 x47, x48 [15,70], [-14,14] 15, 14
x22, x23 [15,50], [-14,14] 26, 14 x49, x50 [15,70], [-14,14] 15, 14
x24, x25 [15,50], [-14,14] 16, -6 x51, x52 [15,70], [-14,14] 15, 14
x26, x27 [15,50], [-14,14] 26, -13 x53, x54 [15,70], [-14,14] 34, 14
Table S14: Government restriction optimisation variables bounds and optimal values
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